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Alterities of global citizenship: 
education, human rights, and everyday bordering 
Mostafa Gamal and Dalene M Swanson1 
 
Abstract 
Assumptions abound regarding societal embetterment at the heart of global 
interconnections and the distributions of knowledge through international 
educational organisations and structures worldwide (Swanson, 2013; 2015). In 
schools and higher education institutions internationally, the cultivation of 
global citizenship in students has been at the centre of policy discourses at both 
institutional and curricular levels. Premised on a hegemonic neoliberal 
assumption that higher education needs to be “responsive to the requirements 
and challenges related to the globalization of societies, economy and labour 
markets” (Kalvemark and Van der Wende, 1997: 19), global citizenship as 
operationalised within policy and curricular discourses purports to enable 
students to “compete successfully in an increasingly cosmopolitan world of 
work by expanding their intercultural and cross-cultural competency” (Haigh, 
2014, p.13). Student mobility is one such mechanism that is reputed to enable 
students to participate in a global knowledge economy by affording them 
opportunities to establish global connections (Andrade, 2006, Bartram, 2008, 
Sherry et al., 2008). Yet, in locating the discussion on global citizenship within a 
broader context of the “securitization” of immigration (Aas, 2011; Huysmans, 
2006), crimmigration (Stumpf, 2006), “new mobilities” (Sheller and Urry, 2006) 
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and the ensuing drive to delegitimise the mobility of others, variously 
constituted as “the refugee, the asylum seeker, the illegal immigrant, or the 
non-citizen”, a darker underbelly of the neoliberal strand of global citizenship is 
revealed. Tracing its under-acknowledged meanings, this article seeks to open 
a theoretical space to trouble this notion of global citizenship in respect of 
some appropriations and applications. The arguments herein seek to recast the 
dominant view of global citizenship in relational terms by problematising “the 
margins or point of contact” (Isin, 2002, p.3) between the global citizen and its 
alterity. Within the operation of relationality, it renders visible the state 
violence inherent, yet hidden, in this space. It foregrounds sites of violence 
enacted through an ’immobile infrastructure’ of bordering, and an extant 
social, political and legal context that legitimises practices such as 
criminalisation, securitisation, detention, deportation and banishment of the 
alterities of the global citizen. These bordering ideologies traverse sites and 
bodies, and become foundational to states of containment as well as everyday 
life in every sphere. It is asserted, as a consequence, that new political 
philosophy requires being countenanced around the figure of the refugee 
rather than the global citizen. 
 
Key Words: Global citizenship/global citizen; Alterities; Internationalisation; 
Bordering; Human rights; Violences; Migrant; Securitisation. 
 
Introduction: Whose Global Citizenship, Whose Rights? 
 
In Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?, Jacques Rancière speaks of the 
historical collapse of the Soviet Union in relation to the rise of what became a 
new myth: the ensuing “charter of the irresistible movement leading to a 
peaceful posthistorical world where global democracy would match the global 
market of liberal economy” (2004, p. 297). For him, the ‘Rights of Man’, 
vaunted as the triumph of Western Enlightenment and Liberal Democracy, 
soon “turned out to be the rights of the rightless, of the populations hunted 
out of their homes and land and threatened by ethnic slaughter. They 
appeared more and more as the rights of the victims, the rights of those who 
were unable to enact any rights or even any claim in their name…” (p. 297-
298). What came with this, according to Rancière, was a creeping suspicion 
that the ‘Man’ in the ‘Rights of Man’ was merely an abstraction, that the real 
rights were the rights of citizens. According to this political understanding, 
one’s rights are no longer a function of a state of nature, the defining features 
of one’s humanity, but are tied to the global construct of nation state. Not 
everyone has rights! Those caught on the other side of the fortified walls of 
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statehood, are rightless, constituted as objects of otherness and derision, 
exemplified in the promulgated, nativist populism of Brexit. At best, under a 
social liberal orientation to this ideological operation, they become charitable 
subjects of sentiment, invested in embodied contradiction (Swanson, 2011), 
inflected with pity and compassion via a ‘politics of benevolence’ (Jefferess, 
2008).     
In a similar vein, Gorgio Agamben (1998) acknowledges Hannah Arendt’s 
critique of the construct of ‘human rights’ where she opines that ‘the 
countryless refugee’ presents an opportunity for the development of a new 
paradigm of historical consciousness. For Agamben, a new subject of the 
representation of the political, other than the prevailing ‘Man’ or ‘Citizen’ and 
their guaranteed rights, should be centralised and held up for political 
attention. For him, a new political philosophy needs, instead, to be built on the 
‘figure of the refugee’. It is in the context of the increasing attention to the 
refugee, the migrant, the stateless subject, the rightless non-citizen, that the 
pervasive neoliberal orientation of the concept of ‘global citizen’ comes into 
stark relief. In so doing, it demands attention and gives voice to its hidden 
shadows. Given the political backdrop of forced mobility and statelessness 
proliferating on a global scale, the questions of ‘whose rights’ and ‘whose 
global citizenship’ rings loudly, provoking the necessities of conscience/ 
consciousness.     
 
Education, alterities and/of global citizenship 
 
Assumptions abound regarding societal embetterment at the heart of global 
interconnections and the distributions of knowledge through international 
educational organisations and structures worldwide (Swanson, 2013; 2015). In 
schools and higher education institutions internationally, the cultivation of 
global citizenship in students has been at the centre of policy discourses at 
both institutional and curricular levels, informing practice, but also being 
shaped by the new managerial behaviourisms (Swanson, 2011; 2015; Swanson 
and Pashby, 2016). How students are to be judged and assessed according to 
measures of ‘global competencies’ is a new way of ‘embedding’ ‘global 
citizenship’ by way of the market, and is code for installing economic interests 
into justice-oriented discourses (Swanson, 2015). At stake in the advancement 
of global citizenship discourses is the coalescing of a set of interests, inter alia 
around a hegemonic neoliberal view of ‘internationalisation’. The hinging of 
‘internationalisation’ and ‘global citizenship’ is neither natural nor 
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disinterested. Such a view of internationalisation through the service of global 
citizenship aims at “making higher education responsive to the requirements 
and challenges related to the globalization of societies, economy and labour 
markets” (Kalvemark and Van der Wende, 1997: 19). In a process of 
intensification of internationalisation and the celebration of new possibilities 
and connections, new limitations have also been produced, although these 
often have “become invisible from the perspective of the dominant gaze 
within the sweep of solidifying discourses on the rightness of international 
‘partnerships’ and marketization of Western-author(iz)ed or Scientifically-
endorsed ‘New Knowledge’” (Swanson, 2013, p. 333-4). The mobility of 
students, the acquisition and quantification of international students, and the 
purported ‘internationalisation of the curriculum’ are examples of mechanisms 
that have occupied a privileged position in these efforts. These initiatives claim 
to enable students to “compete successfully in an increasingly cosmopolitan 
world of work by expanding their intercultural and cross-cultural competency” 
(Haigh, 2014, p.13). Other rhetoric takes less of an overtly economic function, 
hiding behind softer, justice-sounding discourses, yet often conflating liberal 
orientations with neoliberal economic intentions nevertheless (Swanson and 
Pashby, 2016). All in all, these mechanisms are reputed to enable students to 
participate in a global knowledge economy by affording them opportunities to 
establish global connections (Andrade, 2006, Bartram, 2008, Sherry et al., 
2008). 
On another level, in locating the discussion on global citizenship within a 
broader context of the “securitization” of immigration (Aas, 2011; Huysmans, 
2006), crimmigration (Stumpf, 2006), “new mobilities” (Sheller and Urry, 2006) 
and the ensuing drive to delegitimise the mobility of others, variously 
constituted as “the refugee, the asylum seeker, the illegal immigrant, or the 
non-citizen”, a darker underbelly of the neoliberal strand of global citizenship 
is revealed. Tracing its under-acknowledged meanings, this article seeks to 
open a theoretical space to trouble this notion of global citizenship in respect 
of some appropriations and applications. The arguments herein seek to recast 
the dominant view of global citizenship in relational terms by problematising 
“the margins or point of contact” (Isin, 2002, p.3) between the global citizen 
and its alterity. Concomitantly, this article seeks to admit to the realm of 
intelligibility the “excluded”, “excessive” and “wasted humans” who are 
“thrown out of focus, cast in the shadow, forced into the vague or invisible 
background - no longer belonging to ‘what is’” (Bauman, 2004, p.18), by 
rendering visible the state violence inherent, yet hidden, in this space. To 
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speak of global citizenship relationally is to acknowledge that it has 
perspective, power and position. It marks out the spaces of the self/other and 
citizen/non-citizen as quavering dualities intrinsic to it. The approach taken in 
this article does not imply, however, an attempt to address the many ways in 
which the alterities of global citizen are marginalised. To do so would suggest 
that these categories, “the global citizen” and its alterities (“the refugee”, “the 
asylum seeker”, “the illegal immigrant” and “the non-citizen”) “pre-existed 
citizenship and that, once defined, it excluded them…” (Isin, 2002, p.3). Rather, 
the focus of argumentation is on the ways in which the alterities of this strand 
of global citizen are silenced, and yet they also remain features of the 
condition of neoliberalised global citizenship. This operates in a similarly dual 
sense to Derrida’s différance, being both the relational difference and deferral 
of meaning (Derrida, 1978). In this tenor, the “global citizen”, “the refugee”, 
“the asylum seeker”, “the illegal immigrant” and “the non-citizen” do not exist 
as categories in and of themselves, as entities that correspond with particular 
classes of reality, but only in relation to each other. These categories, as the 
alterities of global citizenship, emerge within a set of discursive practices that 
“makes appeal to, or demands on … normative ideals and values, both vis-à-vis 
the state and with respect to other citizens” (Bloemraad, 2018, p. 5). In other 
terms, these alterities perform global citizenship in their regularisation of 
border discourses, marking out ‘legitimate centre’ from ‘de/il-legitimate 
margin’, so that “the other side of the line” (De Sousa Santos, 2007, p. 45) is 
constituted within the discourse of global citizenship, which then performs ‘the 
walling in’ and the border(ing) (Swanson, 2016). 
In advancing its arguments, this article unpacks global citizenship as framed 
within a dominant neoliberal world politics, and traces the ways in which it is 
articulated and theorised. It addresses the normative and aspirational 
characteristics of global citizenship, leading to a second emphasis and parallel 
argument relating to the symbolic and material violence implicated in the 
construction of alterities of global citizenship in global citizenship’s neoliberal 
mode of operation. Two particular sites of this violence are marked out and 
emphasised: the legal and legislative framework that constructs the alterity of 
the global citizen as “threat”; and the spatial and architectural configurations 
that “constrain, immobilize, segregate, incarcerate, or disperse” these 
alterities (Isin, 2002, p.49). The article draws together these lines of argument 
by asserting that in the repetitious, visible performativity of “illegality” in the 
mobility of global alterities, such border(ing) global citizenship performances 
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simultaneously work to render invisible the violence inherent in this denial of 
intersubjective relationality. 
 
Global citizenship and the unfettered mobility 
 
The term, ‘global citizenship’, has gained currency within a range of contexts. 
Its discussion is often linked to globalisation as a political and economic 
rationality.   Government policies and institutional strategies are replete with 
reference to global citizenship and often invoke the ‘feel good’ sentiment of 
the concept as a desired outcome or a key graduate attribute or ‘competency’ 
in educating global graduates. Similarly, academic literature on the 
internationalisation of the curriculum specifies the development of global 
citizenship in the students as a desired outcome. Its meaning, nevertheless, 
remains open to a range of interpretations and appropriations (Swanson, 
2011; Andreotti, 2006, Jefferess, 2008) and this depends on normative, 
existential and aspirational assumptions. In attempting to map the different 
orientations of the ways in which this concept has been understood, a range of 
theorists offer a number of classifications. Andreotti (2006) creates a duality in 
defining a soft vs. critical global citizenship. Swanson and Pashby (2016), 
present versions of global citizenship and global citizenship education as 
shaped by liberal humanist global social justice discourses, nationalist 
discourses, neoliberal discourses, and finally critical discourses that seek 
transformative, emancipatory or anti-oppressive ideals. Stein (2015) suggests 
that discussions of global citizenship can be grouped under the following 
categories: neoliberal, liberal humanist, anti-oppressive and a fourth 
dimension she refers to as an “Incommensurable Position”. Scholars such as 
Andreotti, Abdi, Shultz, Khoo, Stein, Pashby, Swanson, and others have 
asserted that a deepening hegemonic neoliberal orientation to global 
citizenship is being deployed in university strategies and policies worldwide. 
Concomitantly, Akdag and Swanson (2017) note that there is an increasing 
installation of “private interests and neoliberal governance logic within the 
corporate university”, and that the “capital value of education (…) as a private 
good” is tied to a “market-oriented commodification of knowledge within 
universities, underpinned by a repositioning of universities as entrepreneurial 
enterprises” (p. 1). The interest in this version of global citizenship is to enable 
a “largely depoliticized, market-centric means to ensure students will be 
attractive to employers” (Stein, 2015, p. 244). Shultz (2007) also characterises 
this neoliberal global citizen as a highly mobile “entrepreneur” who 
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participates in the global New Knowledge economy. She refers to this global 
citizen as a “traveller” who “strives to create a place beyond traditional 
boundaries and local restrictions where he or she can access the political, 
social, economic, and environmental rewards of participation in a global 
society” (Shultz, 2007, p.250). For this citizen, economic and social 
relationships “are sought freely across time and space without being 
encumbered by national boundaries” (Shultz, 207, 251). The 
internationalisation of Higher Education (HE) is deemed crucial in this process, 
legitimating it within existing institutions. Through activities such as the 
recruitment of international students and exchange programmes, this 
neoliberal orientation to internationalisation of HE is said to increase the 
mobility of students and staff as well as to develop in students global 
attributes such as ‘intercultural competence’, which will enable students to 
“negotiate … a liberal global environment” premised on “a fundamental 
understanding that as individuals we should be able to move through the 
world freely” (Shultz, 2007, p. 252). 
 
Global citizenship in the cosmopolitan tradition 
 
With respect to the liberal humanist view of global citizenship, global 
citizenship education derives much of its conceptual underpinning from a 
theorisation of cosmopolitanism (Stein, 2015). Whilst acknowledging the 
various political, moral, cultural and economic strands of cosmopolitanism, it is 
moral cosmopolitanism, especially as theorised by Nussbaum (1994) and 
Appiah (2005, 2006), that undergirds much of the liberal understanding of this 
term. According to Hansen (2008), moral cosmopolitanism “pivots around 
conceptions of the good, of justice, or of virtue that are said to cut across 
political, cultural, and religious boundaries” (2008, p. 292),  qualities that are 
cultivated through “open-mindedness and impartiality” (2008, p. 292). 
Nussbaum and Appiah are exponents of this approach. According to 
Nussbaum, liberal education seeks to cultivate in global citizens three 
distinctive capacities: 
 
the Socratic ability to criticize one’s own traditions and to carry on an 
argument on terms of mutual respect for reason; (2) the ability to think as a 
citizen of the whole world, not just some local region or group; and (3) the 
‘narrative imagination,’ the ability to imagine what it would be like to be in 
the position of someone very different from oneself. (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 
289) 
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This moral cosmopolitanism translates into a view of global citizenship as the 
cultivation of intercultural understanding and sensitivity, granting credence to 
and enabling “a commitment to development projects in the Global South, 
whether through research, service learning, or other engagements” (Stein, 
2015, p.245). 
These moralistic and liberal views of a cosmopolitan global citizenship have 
been extensively critiqued from different perspectives and on a number of 
levels (see Andreotti, 2006; Shultz, 2007; Pashby, 2011; Swanson, 2011, 2015; 
Swanson and Pashby, 2016). Among these critiques is the assertion that a 
liberal humanist view focuses “global relationships on an individual level, 
rather than on a structural scale” (Stein, 2015), whilst the neoliberal view 
reduces global citizenship to a set of competences that are acquired through 
education. A third strand of global citizenship theorizing is marked by demands 
for “more critical, politicized, and historicized approaches to global 
engagement” (Stein, 2015, p.246). In its various forms, this orientation seeks 
to decolonize global citizenship education by problematising the Eurocentric 
roots of global citizenship and cosmopolitanism (Swanson, 2015; Stein, 2015). 
In this sense, “global citizenship’s institutionalization as the ‘great white hope’ 
of international relations (Brysk, 2002), testifies to its often racialized and 
privileged framing” (Swanson, 2015, p. 28), and global citizenship operations in 
this mode seek to “identify how colonial, racialized, and gendered flows of 
power, wealth, and knowledge operate to the advantage of the Global North, 
as a whole, and elites in both the Global North and South” (Stein, 2015, p. 
246).   
While this brief contextualisation of global citizenship offers some ways in 
which the term is conceptualised, such operations are not exhaustive. 
Nevertheless, two interrelated issues are brought to the fore that course 
through these discourses. The first one relates to the normative aspect that 
dominates the liberal humanist understanding of global citizenship. Whilst this 
approach recognises the need to “incorporate into notions of citizenship ideas 
about global social justice, the environment, difference” (Barlin, 2011, p. 256), 
it is marked by an “almost exclusive concern with defining new, better models 
[of global citizenship], capable of addressing the kind of political and social 
issues which are of current concern” (p.357). By advocating personal renewal 
or transformation as opposed to structural changes in the conditions that give 
rise to global inequalities and dominance, this view of global citizenship 
translates into a normative and aspirational view of the global citizen as 
someone who: 
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 is aware of the wider world and has a sense of their own role as a 
world citizen; 
 respects and values diversity; 
 has an understanding of how the world works; 
 is outraged by social injustice; 
 participates in the community at a range of levels, from the local to 
the global; 
 is willing to act to make the world a more equitable and sustainable 
place; 
 takes responsibility for their actions.  
(Oxfam, 1997, 2006, cited in Barlin, 2011) 
 
This model of the global citizen, its conditions for belonging, as well as the 
attributes to be cultivated, are premised on a view of citizenship “as an 
extension of and thus rooted in national citizenship” (Pashby, 2011, p.437). 
This also is undergirded by a view of the global citizen as a normative citizen-
subject whose “identities move naturally and neutrally from a 
Northern/Western context of family to nation to global community” (Pashby, 
2011, p. 437). 
These views evoke the following questions: What is the nature of the 
political community which is presumedly enacted by this conception of global 
citizenship? Who is fit for this exercise of global citizenship? In grappling with 
these questions, the global citizenship can be problematised by addressing its 
“obscene” Other (De Genova, 2013): the refugee, the asylum seeker, the 
deportee, the “illegal” immigrant. This attests to the ways in which these 
categories, construed as “probationary” citizens, “failed citizens” (Swanson, 
2013; Anderson, 2014), and “tolerated citizens” (Anderson, 2014), are inherent 
in particular discourses of (global) citizenship. This constitution is marked by 
symbolic and material state violence. It can be referenced in relation to the 
ways in which alterities of global citizenship are governed, regulated and 
marked by an array of disciplinary discourses and practices, such as illegality, 
criminality, surveillance, detention, deportation and banishment. This strand 
of global citizenship can thus be articulated in its ontological relationality to 
what it seeks to silence and exclude. Reciprocally, the unfettered mobility and 
freedom of movement that activates the neoliberal version of global 
citizenship exacts problematisation. By contrast, mobility is not a neutral 
aspect of globalisation as attested to within the hegemonic neoliberal notion 
of global citizenship, but as Beauchamps, et al.,(2017) avers, “[M]obility is 
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never innocent”. It is an uneven process where gainsto some simultaneously 
enact what Sheller and Urry (2006, p. 210) refer to as “disconnection, social 
exclusion, and inaudibility” for others (cited in Beauchamps et al., 2017, p. 6). 
This leads to a consideration of what can be called ‘the violence of inscription’. 
 
The violence of inscription 
 
The darker underbelly of a neoliberal version of global citizenship, as pointed 
to earlier, can be understood in terms of innate violences. Brown (2010) aptly 
testifies to these violences in her commentary: 
 
What we have come to call globalized world harbors fundamental tensions 
between opening and barricading, fusion and partition, erasure and 
reinscription. These tensions materialize as increasingly liberalized borders, 
on the one hand, and the development of unprecedented funds, energies, 
and technologies to border fortification, on the other. (p.7) 
 
The issue of mobility underscores these violences in its inherent 
contradiction in relation to global citizenship. The literature on 
internationalisation and global citizenship education (GCE) is replete with 
various expressions of respect for diversity and the cognitive, affective, cultural 
and social outcomes associated with engaging diversity. In the case of HE, 
global citizenship purportedly affords opportunities to develop “cross-cultural 
capability” (Killick, 2011) in students. Internationalisation is also said to 
develop “respect and tolerance among people”, to foster a “commitment to 
international solidarity” and “human security” as well as build “a climate of 
global peace” (International Association of Universities, cited in Black, 2004, 
p.24). The mobility of the student is seen as crucial in this process. As Blond, et 
al. (2007, p.28) suggests: “Mobility promotes a deeper understanding of 
different cultures and values, going beyond mere familiarity to encourage 
personal friendship across national boundaries, and demonstrates a country’s 
interest in achieving a reciprocal relationship with the rest of the world”. 
Running parallel to this free and unfettered mobility, however, are a set of 
practices and discourses that simultaneously construct certain types of 
political subjectivities, while delegitimising their mobility, and in some cases by 
relegating these subjectivities to a “variegated spectrum of ‘legalities’, 
‘illegalities’ ” (De Genova, 2013) and conditionalities. As Cresswell (2010, p.20) 
avers, “forms of mobility … are political – they are implicated in the production 
of power and relations of domination”. 
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The discussion that follows explores this paradox by opening up a space, 
not only to grasp the conditions of these marginalised and precarious 
subjectivities, but to render visible the violence implicated in their inscription. 
It also attests to the symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
implicated in the erasure of these conditions within dominant global 
citizenship discourse. In order to articulate the “obscene” Other (De Genova, 
2013) of the global citizen, the legal, political and social processes that set the 
contours through which this Other of the global citizen is rendered intelligible 
need being addressed.  As a start, this requires examining some of the 
“immobile infrastructure” of bordering, not as mere barriers that hinder 
movement, but rather as “spectacle” (De Genova, 2013) for the production, 
securitisation and criminalisation of certain mobilities. This necessitates an 
examination of the social, political and legal context that provides a rationale 
for these structures, as well as a review of practices that illustrate the inherent 
state violence implicated in them. 
 
Fixities, spectacles, and illegalities 
 
Drawing on insights from critical geography and the “new mobilities” paradigm 
(Sheller and Urry, 2006), attention can be granted, not only to the idea of flow, 
but also to the “seemingly immobile infrastructures of security” (Beauchamps, 
et al., 2017), such as borders, checkpoints and walls. These ‘fixities” and 
“moorings” (Urry 2003, p. 138) do not only inhibit and constrain movements 
and mobility, but are sites that have different effects on mobility and produce 
different articulations of (non)belonging. As Pallitto and Heyman (2008) argue, 
borders, border security regimes and their techniques of identification, 
inspection, clearance, and surveillance are sites for the production and 
amplification of differential mobility effects, and in this sense, “the ability of 
individuals to negotiate borders becomes unequal” (p. 318). These inequalities 
are manifest in three intersecting categories, namely: inequalities of rights, 
inequalities of risk, and inequalities of movement (Pallitto and Heyman, 2008, 
p. 318). These “fixities” and the security techniques that categorise travellers 
are also “spectacles” for the “sociopolitical production of migrant ‘illegality’” 
(De Genova, 2013, p. 1181). Not only do these fixities render ‘illegality’ visible 
and performative, but they also come to represent:   
 
….spaces for the production of the spectacles of ‘illegal’ passage and ever-
increasingly militarized interdiction become emblematic precisely, in the 
haunting phrase of Joseph Nevins (2002, p. 144), as ‘landscapes of death’, 
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as well as zones that are inseparable from the accompanying experiences of 
rape, mutilation, disappearance and protracted irremediable trauma”. 
(p.1182) 
 
The violence inherent in these spaces and zones are manifestations of the 
“theatrics of propping up sovereignty” (Brown, 2010, p. 93). As Brown (2010) 
avers, the intensity of border fortification is underpinned by the “promise to 
secure, protect, rehabilitate, contain or keep at bay” the “generic… 
threatening figures of otherness” (p.115) and “gratify a wish for sovereignty 
restored to the subject, as well as to the state” (Brown, 2010, p.107). But 
“these immobile infrastructures of security”: 
 
generate an increasingly closed and policed collective identity in place of 
the open society they would defend … [W]alls are not merely ineffective in 
resurrecting the eroding nation-state sovereignty to which they respond, 
but they contribute new forms of xenophobia and parochialism to a 
postnational era. They abet the production of subjects defended against 
worldliness. (Brown, 2010, p. 41) 
 
These zones and the assemblage of securitisation technologies 
(identification, sorting, surveillance) they operate within, as well as the 
violence they enact, disguise and justify, are intelligible within the context of a 
range of discursive practices. Examples of such practices are the securitisation 
of certain political subjectivities, detention and deportation. However, before 
attending to the ways in which these border technologies operate, a 
consideration of the discourses that inform them would serve to highlight the 
“connection of power, subjugation and exploitation articulated through 
racism, to those associated with class, gender and religion” (Bhui, 2016, p. 
276). That is to say, in considering the inequalities of movement (Pallitto and 
Heyman, 2008, p. 318), which produce “the global hierarchy of mobility’ 
(Bauman, 1998, p. 69)”, through the concept of intersectionality, these 
securitisation technologies illuminate “how membership in more than one 
marginalized group can increase the magnitude of the disadvantage facing 
particular subgroups” (Johnson, 2009, p.4). In particular, race, class and gender 
have concomitantly operated as key tropes “to justify control and exclusion” of 
the “unwanted” (Bhui, 2016, p.274), a process referred to as xeno-racism. 
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Race and Class: (im)mobilities 
 
As a practice of exclusion and discrimination, xeno-racism (Fekete, 2001; 
Sivanandan, 2001; Weber and Bowling, 2008) “is discrimination against people 
not just because of the colour of their skin, but because of a range of other 
identities, including poverty, asylum-seeking status and religion” (Bhui, 2016, 
p.274). As Sivanandan, (2001, p.2) avers, xeno-racism is: 
 
a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the former 
colonial countries, but at the newer categories of the displaced and 
dispossessed whites, who are beating at western Europe's doors, the 
Europe that displaced them in the first place. It is racism in substance but 
xeno in form - a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers even if 
they are white. 
 
The ways in which markers of poverty and racial difference are mobilised in 
border technologies “to select, eject and immobilize” (Italic in original, Weber 
and Bowling, 2008, p. 367) coalesce around two discriminatory practices. The 
first one relates to the “persistence of both covert and, in some cases, explicit 
racial profiling in the policing of immigration law” to constrain the mobility of 
others (Bhui, 2016, p. 273). The second one relates to immigration entry rules, 
including pre-entry clearance, which have the explicit aim of excluding the 
poor.  
Whilst the full complexity and diversity of the the linkage between race and 
migration cannot be captured here (for a critical review of the overlapping nexi 
between migration and racialisation, see Erel et al., 2016), this section will be 
limited to illustrating one aspect of racial profiling as a discriminatory practice 
used in “sorting” passengers in airports. Woodfield et al (2006) established the 
following in their study: 
 
… 5 per 10,000 White Northern passengers were issued an IS81 [Authority 
to detain for examination/further examination]. In contrast, White 
Southern passengers were stopped at a rate of 38 per 10,000 and Black 
passengers were stopped at a rate of 86 per 10,000 (17 times the rate for 
White Northern passengers). For other ethnic groups (Asian, Oriental, 
Middle Eastern and Mixed Race) the IS81 rates were all around the 14 to 19 
per 10,000 level, higher than the rates for the White Northern group but 
lower than the rates for White Southern and Black passengers (p. 2006, 
p.30). 
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Additionally, Woodfield et al (2006) compared the difference between white 
and non-white passengers from Canada, the USA and South Africa in terms of 
being stopped for further questioning in the UK. For white Americans, the stop 
rate is 2 per 10,000, while for ‘non-white’ passengers this rate rose to 5 per 
10,000. For white Canadians, the stop rate is 4 per 10,000 but for ‘non-white’ 
passengers the figure rose to 35. For South African White passengers, the rate 
the stop rate is 14, whereas for ‘non–white’ passengers this rate rose to 148 
per 10,000 (Woodfield et al., 2006, p. 31). 
Whilst the markers of ethnicity have clearly guided the decisions of 
immigration officers in the Woodfield et al. (2006) study, discrimination based 
on assumptions about the social-economic status of passengers 
“disproportionately affect poor migrants seeking entry” (Bhui, 2016, p. 373). 
This is evident not only in point of entry, but also in pre-entry clearance 
conditions. As Woodfield et al., demonstrate, the decision to grant/deny entry 
to passengers is based on a range of assumptions that relate to the financial 
status of the passenger. In other words, class markers are used by immigration 
officers in order to exclude “the disadvantaged ‘suspect’ poor who threaten 
established privilege, and who occupy the lower reaches of the ‘global 
hierarchy of mobility’ (Bauman, 1998, p. 69)” (Bhui, 2016, p. 275). In this 
respect, Woodfield et al. note: 
 
Passengers’ appearance and clothing may also be of interest to IOs 
[Immigration Officers]. Some people ‘look the part’, for example, “smart, 
well-dressed businessmen” or “American ladies who’ve got loads of 
jewellery on … their hair is perfect … their make up is perfect, and their 
clothes are really nice”. In these cases, the passengers’ appearance implies 
confidence and affluence. In other situations, however, passengers who 
‘look the part’ may raise concern, such as young women wearing white 
stiletto shoes and short skirts, who might possibly be involved in 
prostitution. Passengers with very cheap worn clothing, who look “very 
impoverished”, may be asked how much money they have brought with 
them. (Woodfield et al, 2006, p.15) 
 
What is striking about what the study by Woodfield et al. reveals is not just 
that it reaffirms the view that “class, and more specifically, poverty, has long 
been associated with problematic mobility and has been central to the process 
of sorting … the welcome from the unwelcome” (Weber and Bowling, 2008, p. 
363), but rather the “class contempt” it articulates (Webster, 2008). For 
Webster, “class contempt varies from the subtlest forms of aversion to visceral 
revulsion, disgust and sneering that serves to project all that is bad and 
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immoral onto the other, while reciprocally enhancing and confirming the 
goodness, self-regard and status of one’s own class” (2008, p.293). This 
process of making poverty as the failure to embody a habitus (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992) that is congruent with middle class norms is used to 
distinguish between what Bauman (1996) refers to as “tourists” and 
“vagabonds”. For tourists, “mobility is the name of the game: one must be able 
to move when the needs push or the dreams call. This ability the tourists call 
freedom, autonomy or independence, and they cherish it more than anything 
else” (p. 12). The vagabound, by contrast, is: 
 
… the tourist’s alter ego – just as the destitute is the alter ego of the rich, 
the savage the alter ego of the civilised, or the stranger the alter ego of the 
native. Being an alter ego means to serve as a rubbish bin into which all 
ineffable premonitions, unspoken fears, secret self-deprecations and guilts 
too awesome to be thought of are dumped; to be alter ego means to serve 
as a public exposition of the innermost private, as an inner demon to be 
publicly exorcised, an effigy in which all that which cannot be suppressed 
may be burnt. Alter ego is the dark and sinister backcloth against which the 
purified ego may shine. (p.15) 
 
The recent debate in the UK about whether or not international students 
should be included in the net migration figures the government wishes to 
reduce is a case in point. The bill, which has subsequently been amended to 
exclude international students from the migration figures, has been opposed 
by a range of institutions. #WeAreInternational, the campaign group which is 
supported by many universities and business organisations, declared its firm 
“commitment to the UK remaining a welcoming home of global scholarship, 
which provides a superb education to the most talented people from around 
the world”, and that the inclusion of international students in net migration 
figures “could damage the UK’s long standing reputation for leading global 
higher education”. Whilst, this sentiment is to be applauded in so far as it 
amplifies the voices of the “immigrant”, the economic driver is the guiding 
principle, to which the rhetoric of this campaign testifies: 
 
students studying at UK universities bring economic, social and cultural 
benefits at a local and national level. Two thirds of British adults (66 per 
cent) agree that international students have a positive impact on the local 
economies of the towns and cities that they study in, and three in five (59 
per cent) agree that the economic contribution of international students 
helps create jobs. 61 per cent agree that international students have a 
valuable social and cultural impact on the towns and cities they live in … 
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Non-UK students generate an estimated £11 billion for the economy. EU 
students alone contributed £3.7bn for the UK economy and supported over 
34,000 jobs in all corners of the country. 
 
Bauman’s tourists are welcome as they will “draw upon the sometimes vast 
resources necessary to make educational mobility happen” (Brookes and 
Waters, 2011, p. 130) in exchange for the opportunity to accumulate 
international cultural and social capital. In contrast to this, vagabonds are seen 
as a “a fiscal liability” (Weber and Bowling, 2008, p.370) and are not worthy of 
our advocacy.    
As noted earlier, the second discriminatory practice is evidenced by the 
pre-entry clearance visa process. As is the case with the above, the aim is to 
“manage migration” by selecting and attracting certain categories of 
“immigrants” that will contribute to the economy of the host country. In the 
case of pre-entry visa to the USA, Johnson (2009, p.8) suggests that “three 
features of modern U.S. immigration laws (many more could be added) 
operate to discriminate—directly or indirectly—on the basis of class: the 
public-charge exclusion, the per-country caps on immigration, and the limited 
number of employment visas for low- and moderately-skilled workers”. 
Accordingly, the Immigration & Nationality Act requires that consular officers 
consider the following attributes before issuing an entry visa:  the applicant’s 
age, health, family status, assets, resources and financial status, and education 
and skills. Similarly, to gain entry to the UK, a range of documents need to be 
submitted to consular staff. In addition to a valid passport, documents relating 
to the financial status of applicants are given prominence and these include: 
 
Financial documents showing that you have sufficient funds available. 
These must clearly show that you have access to the funds, such as:   
 bank statements 
 building society book 
 proof of earnings such as a letter from employer confirming 
employment details 
 (start date of employment, salary, role, company contact 
details) where a third party (who is either in the UK or who will 
be legally in the UK at the time of your visit) is providing 
financial support to you e.g. a business, a friend or a relative, 
documents to show they have sufficient resources to support 
you in addition to themselves and any dependant family 
should be provided  
(UK Visa and Applications) 
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In both cases, as Johnston (2009, p. 9) concludes, “prospective entrant must 
establish that he or she is and will continue to be a member of a particular 
socioeconomic class—most definitely not poor or likely to ever become poor—
to lawfully migrate”. 
At the basis of these securitising discursive practices is contradiction, 
reinforcing the various faces of violence and performing the violence of 
contradiction itself. This is a violence that is at once overt and hidden, 
representational and structural, and manifest in the bordering technologies 
and processes of securitisation. 
 
Securitisation and the violence of/in contradiction 
 
In a content analysis of media representation of Europe’s 2015 “refugee 
crisis”, Greussing et al. (2017) argue that the portrayal of refugees and asylum 
seekers oscillates between two discourses: A victimisation discourse that 
conceives of these subjects as “innocent victims… in need of help because of 
circumstances that lie beyond their own responsibilities” (p. 1751); and a 
problem discourse that frames them “as invaders and threat to the physical, 
economic, and cultural well-being of the respective host country” (p. 1751). 
These arrivals are associated “with illegality, terrorism, and crime …and are 
accused of draining public resources that would otherwise be granted to 
members of the host society” (p. 1751). As Muller (2004) suggests, within 
citizenship and immigration policies, the use of discourses and images of 
threat to national identity, state sovereignty, social stability and insecurity, 
represented by “the migrant, refugee, alien, and ‘Other’”, has intensified in 
recent decades. By invoking the figure of the migrant, refugee and asylum 
seeker as an “existential threat” (William, 2003, p. 516), these political 
identities are “securitized”, or made into a “security issue”. 
What is of theoretical and political concern about this securitisation is the 
“representational violence” it entails (Carpi, 2014). According to securitisation 
theory, the issue of “security” is not an objective condition, but it is both 
relational and socially-constructed through a regime of “securitizing speech–
acts”. That is to say, identities and issues become ‘securitised’ through a range 
of social processes and representations that “do not simply describe ‘an 
existing security situation’ (who or what is being secured and from whom), but 
bring into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such” 
(William, 2003, p. 513). In securitising the political identities of the migrant, 
refugee and asylum seeker, what is also played out in its intensity is a further 
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aspect of “representational violence”, one that seeks to depolicise the figure 
of the refugee and asylum seeker. Accordingly, these figures are no longer 
what brings “home distant noises of war and the stench of gutted homes and 
scorched villages” (Bauman, 2004, p. 76), but rather one that seeks to reify and 
proclaim a monolith of identities for these alterities as the “unwanted”. 
Bauman (2004) articulates some of the ways in which the identities of the 
“unwanted” are cemented: 
 
Overgeneral, unwarranted or even fanciful as the association of terrorists 
with asylum seekers and ‘economic migrant’ might have been, it did the 
job: the figure of the ‘asylum seeker’, once prompting human compassion 
and spurring an urge to help, has been sullied and defiled, while the very 
idea of ‘asylum’, once a matter of civil and civilized pride, has been 
reclassified as a dreadful concoction of shameful naivety, and criminal 
irresponsibility (p.57). 
 
As William (2003, p.519) notes, once these identities are securitised, “their 
negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied, or suppressed”. 
One aspect of the securitisation of immigration is that which is referred to 
as the criminalisation of immigration (Aas, 2011; Huysmans, 2006; Stumpf, 
2007). In this tenor, the criminal justice system and the immigration law 
converge (Aas and Bosworth, 2013; Stumpf, 2006; Turnbull and Hasselberg, 
2016), and alter the nature of the judicial status of citizenship and “illegality”, 
as well as the relationship of the individual to the state (De Genova 2002, p. 
422). In the UK, for example, successive governments have introduced a range 
of increasingly repressive legislation that has shifted the context of 
‘immigration’ to the domain of criminal law. Whilst a detailed chronology of 
the various legislation that contributed to this convergence falls outside the 
remit of this article, some of the crucial legislations that provided the legal 
framework need noting. This framework supports and informs the cultural 
context for the criminalisation of the immigrant. 
 
Historical notes on law, securitisation and bordering 
 
As a historical exercise, it is noteworthy that Cherti (2014) provides a useful 
chronology of legislation relating to immigration in the UK from 1904 to 2014. 
According to Cherti (2014), the criminalisation of “irregular” immigration was 
first introduced in the Immigration Act 1971, but this criminalisation has 
intensified from 1997 till the present. The 1971 Immigration Act configured the 
category of the “illegal entrant”, constituted as a “person unlawfully entering 
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or seeking to enter in breach of a deportation order or the immigration laws 
and including also a person who has so entered” (cited in Cherti, 2014, p. 5). 
Various legislations have followed this legal direction, however the intensity 
and “the frenzy of law making activity” (Cherti, 2014, p. 10) has signalled a 
greater reliance on the criminal justice system and the associated penal 
institutions and agencies with respect to immigration. Some of the official 
pronouncements have explicitly advocated and justified the resort to criminal 
law. For instance, Jack Straw, Home Secretary from 1997-2001, stated that 
“the enforcement [of immigration rules] must be backed by the national law” 
(cited in Cherti, 2014, p. 11). Similarly, in the 1988 green paper, Fairer, Faster 
and Firmer, states that “the criminal law has a role to play in stamping out 
abuse of immigration control” (Home Office 1998, cited in Cherti, 2014, p.11). 
To this effect, a number of legislations have added 84 new types of 
immigration offences, compared with only 70 that were introduced between 
1905 and 1998 (Aliverti, 2012). These new “offences” can be classified “as 
supporting different purposes”, such as the removal and the detection of 
“offenders”. In legal terms, the failure to comply with specific duties on the 
part of the “immigrant” is treated as an offence. For instance, “failure to 
attend and give evidence or produce documents before an immigration judge, 
the failure by a detainee to submit to medical examination and the failure to 
supply information requested by the authorities, by employers or financial 
institutions” (Aliverti, 2012, p. 421) incurs criminal sanctions, leading to 
deportation. The second group of offences serves the purpose of detection. 
These replicate existing laws such as deception and document fraud, including 
false identity documents.   
As it stands, the list of new immigration offences or the “hyper-
criminalisation” of immigration (Aliverti, 2012) covers a number of activities 
(see the UK’s Crown Prosecution Service for a list of these offences). 
Underscoring the enduring process of criminalisation is socio-political context. 
In the UK, for example, this frenzy of restrictive and criminalising legislation, as 
Aliverti (2012) argues, needs to be understood as the government’s “response 
to public pressure to bring immigration under control” (p.  421). This move is 
against the background of “increasing social anxieties about the steady 
dismantling of the welfare state, the erosion of social security protections and 
the restructuring of the labour market” (p. 421). Similarly, the rise of 
nationalist popul(ar)ism (Gamal and Swanson, 2017) has led to, as noted 
before, “the theatrics of propping up sovereignty” (Brown, 2010) through 
devising and implementing draconian immigration legislation. As Garland 
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(2001) suggests, by resorting to the criminal justice system, this reaction is 
“acting out” what can be understood as “a form of denial or evasion by the 
State that, conscious about the impossibility of or difficulties in solving a 
particular problem—such as reducing crime, improving social conditions or 
managing immigration, adopts more criminal legislation” (Garland, 2001, p. 
131, cited in Aliverti, 2012, p. 421). This shoring up of sovereignty, “acting 
out”, and the violence it entails, can perhaps be better illustrated by Theresa 
May’s pronouncement of creating measures to “give illegal migrants a really 
hostile reception” (Home Secretary May in The Telegraph 2012) by creating “a 
hostile environment”. This approach is joined with the practices and 
performances of everyday ‘bordering and ordering’ (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018), 
that enacts material, representational and symbolic violences against the non-
citizen Other. 
 
Immigration, criminalization, and (de)citizenship discourses 
 
The discursive and political coupling of immigration and criminalisation, as well 
as the legal and legislative framework that undergirds it, occasions a shift in 
thinking about mobility. In contrast to a hegemonic neoliberal discourse of 
global citizenship that conceives of mobility as unfettered, the criminalisation 
of migration (‘crimmigration’) recasts mobility “as a criminal act, to which the 
appropriate state response is punitive and carceral” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 535). 
Related to this approach is that discussion of global citizenship necessarily 
engenders a corresponding discussion of the precarity and vulnerability 
exacted in the mobility of certain political identities, as constructed by the 
legal framework noted earlier. As Ettlinger (2007, p. 322) suggests, “precarity 
lies in the unpredictability of terror, which can emanate from a wide range of 
contexts”. It is “engendered by a wide range of processes” and “extends across 
space and time and also materializes (differently) in social, economic, political, 
and cultural spheres” (p. 324). The resort to an assemblage of securitisation 
technologies and criminal law–prosecution, conviction and imprisonment–in 
rendering the mobility of the “Other” intelligible by situating it within “a 
different moral, ethical and legal framework for dealing with non-citizens” 
(Bosworth and Guild, 2008, p. 712), brings to light the precarity it installs 
within the system, which becomes manifest in the practice of indefinite 
detention and deportation. 
As De Genova (2013) argues, border policing and immigration procedures 
as well as various immobile structures, render visible the spectacle of 
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“illegality”.  Similarly, these practices and structures render visible and elevate 
to the status of ‘the real’ the threat posed by the non-citizen. Zembylas (2009) 
argues nevertheless that in making ‘migrants’ visible, what is rendered 
invisible is that many of their rights are being violated. These violations range 
from the state practicing a deliberate policy of destitution of groups that are 
highly vulnerable (Darling, 2009), including prevention of access to work, 
education, health care and housing (Tyler, 2006), to detention and 
deportation.  
Within the UK context, the resort to the detention of “unwanted” non-
citizens remains an administrative issue and its legality “is determined 
administratively” (Costello, 2015, p. 144). To appreciate the scale of the resort 
to detention, the following commentary highlights research commissioned by 
the UK Bar Council: 
 
The UK has one of the largest immigration detention systems in Europe. 
There are around 3,400 people being held in immigration detention, and 
the numbers have increased considerably over the last decade. There are 
nine dedicated ‘Immigration Removal Centres’ around the UK, many run by 
private, profit-making security contractors, using detainee labour at wages 
as low as £1 per hour to augment their competitive edge. Some 14% of 
immigration detainees are held in prisons, typically after serving a custodial 
sentence. Around 30,000 people spend widely varying lengths of time in 
immigration detention centres each year, indeed some people spend 
several years in detention, as there is no time limit (Lindley, 2017, p.4). 
 
As Costello (2015) notes, there are “many troubling aspects” of 
immigration detention in the UK. Amongst these, she outlines a number of 
“procedural deficits” such as the fact that “there is no requirement for judicial 
approval or review for detention to be lawful. The legality of detention is 
determined administratively. Bail applications may be brought, but these do 
not review the legality of detention as such, and many detainees do not bring 
these applications” (p. 144). In contrast to this, “in some other jurisdictions, 
judges review the legality of detention automatically at regular intervals”. 
Further, the UK immigration detention system “may be indefinite in duration—
there is no legal outer time limit for detention” (p.144). The legal justification 
for immigration detention, compared with other forms of deprivation of 
liberty, does not seem to be “constrained by human rights law” (Costello, 
2015, p. 143). Thus, in the absence of grounds for the deprivation of liberty, 
immigration detention entails forms of detention that are “highly suspect”: 
preventive detention (to prevent the detainee from engaging in a particular 
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conduct in the future), coercive detention (to ensure compliance on the part of 
the detainee with legal requirement) and punitive detention (to be meted out 
after conviction of a crime) (Costello, 2015, p.146). In the absence of judicial 
safeguards as previously outlined, the figure of the detainee is cast in “the 
condition of luminal drift”: 
 
…with no way of knowing whether it is transitory or permanent. Even if 
they are stationary for a time, they are on a journey that is never completed 
since its destination (arrival or return) remains forever unclear, while a 
place they could call ‘final’ remains forever inaccessible. They are never to 
be free from the gnawing sense of the transience, indefiniteness and 
provisional nature of any settlement. (Bauman, 2004, p. 76) 
 
Taken together, these practices of privation, “deliberate policy of 
destitution”, the suspension of due process, and the normalisation of the 
violence of the state, symbolic and material, that these entail, might reflect 
Agamben's (1998) categorisation of “bare life”, as a figure “outside the law” 
(Darling, 2009, p. 650). Agamben conceives of “bare life” in reference to the 
“homo sacer” of Roman Law: the banned – the figure who can be killed and is 
yet not worthy of sacrifice. This figure is denied “the rights of the politicised 
citizen” at the same time as it “acts to assert the authority of the sovereign 
through their exclusion from politicised life” (Darling, p. 651). That is to say, 
the reduction to “bare life”, an existence stripped of its political significance, 
entails a double violence in its relationship to the political: “first, in the form of 
the exclusion from the polis—it is included in the political in the form of 
exclusion—and, second, in the form of the unlimited exposure to violation, 
which does not count as a crime” (Ziarek, 2008, p. 90). The detention centre is 
thus the Agembian camp, which is a space “opened when the state of 
exception begins to become the rule. In the camp, the state of exception ... is 
now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as such nevertheless 
remains outside the normal order'' (Agemben, 1998, p. 169, original emphasis, 
cited in Darling, 2009, p. 652). Similarly, as William (2002, p. 286) suggests, the 
detention centre or camp “delivers surplus humanity into a zone of 
indistinction, invoking a near permanent state of emergency to place its 
subjects indefinitely ‘on hold’ on the edge of the juridical order—all so that the 
sovereign system of states and its division of citizens to states can be re-
established”.  As a site of violence and violation of rights, the detention centre 
is the space in which the “homo sacer”– who is “no longer recognised as 
‘legitimate’ or worthy of the right to exist in the UK” (Darling, 2009, p. 651) - is 
abandoned. As Mills (2004, p.42) avers, for Agemben, “the originary relation of 
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the law to life is not application, but abandonment'” (cited in Darling, 2009, p. 
651). Further, such abandonment acts as a violent force to refuse “those 
whose lives it controls” from any “politically valid response”. It therefore 
“operates as a form of technologised administration” (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 
2005, p. 23, cited in Darling, 2009, p. 651). 
If detention acts as a “sovereign act of abandonment which places 
individuals outside the law” (Darling, 2009, p. 652), whilst simultaneously 
inside its territory, deportation as “a normalised and quotidian part of 
immigration and social control” (Anderson, et al., 2011) articulates a further 
instance of state violence, which is enacted through the processes for 
constructing “the deportable subject” (Anderson, et al., 2011, p.552). In this 
vein, the rise of the “deportation state” (Anderson, et al., 2011, p. 552) and the 
increasing reliance on criminal justice techniques to forcibly remove people, 
“establishes, in a particularly powerful and definitive way, that an individual is 
not fit for citizenship or even further residence in the society in question” 
(Anderson, et al., 2011, p. 548). The hyper-criminalisation (Aliverti, 2012) of 
the non-citizen engendered by the reclassification of the mobility and 
behaviour of migrants “from immigration to criminal matters” has led to an 
increase in the number of immigration offences and ‘crimes’ that particularly 
“likely to be, or can only be, committed by non-citizens such as entering the 
country without a valid identity document, not cooperating with removal and 
working without permission.” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 536). The deportable subject - 
instituted in the legal and legislative process - is constituted, in De Genova’s 
(2013) terms, as “citizenship’s obscene supplement… mobilized as an alarming 
signal of estrangement” and one that “supplies the proxy for reactionary 
populist paroxysms of exclusionary animosity” (p. 1194).  
This state of play raises two issues: The first relates to the re-figuring of the 
status of the very being of the deportee. That is to say, in casting the deportee 
as “a criminal” and deportation as a measure that reveals a person’s “‘criminal 
lifestyle’ or ‘criminal character’” (Griffiths, 2017), the “incontestably and 
indelibly criminal” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 531) renders rehabilitation impossible. 
This symbolic, and hence also representational, violence has shifted the focus 
“from people’s specific, verified actions, to their being: from incidents to 
persona” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 542). Thus, whilst prison “(in part) punishes 
behavior”, deportation “punishes presence and being” (Griffiths, 2017, p. 542). 
In this manner, as Aliverti (2012, p. 429) suggests, “criminal punishment is then 
redundant and unfit to deal with immigration offenders. The actual role of 
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criminal punishment in relation to the individual offenders is emptied of 
content”. 
The second issue relates to deportation as “a technology of citizenship” 
(Walters, 2002, p. 288). That is to say, as Bosworth and Guild (2008: 317) 
suggest, deportation has a “constitutive role to play, both in formulating an 
ideal of the British citizen and in establishing the borders of the nation state. 
Citizenship in this mode is both “formal and normative” (Anderson, 2014, p. 3). 
As a formal entity, citizenship entails a legal status of rights and responsibilities 
exercised within a polity. As a normative entity, citizenship is a “marker of 
identification” (Hindess, 2000, p. 1487) to a community of value that is 
populated “not simply by Citizens, but by Good Citizens, imagined law-abiding 
and hard-working members of stable and respectable families” (Anderson, 
2014, p. 3). Deportation, thus, “affirms the political community’s idealised 
view of what membership should (or should not) mean” (Anderson, et al., 
2011, p.548). This raises the question of the nature of the normative political 
community articulated in school curricula, citizenship tests, ceremonies, 
deportation and “British values”. Perhaps more importantly, deportation and 
deprivation of citizenship as Fargues (2017: 884) suggests should be seen as an 
effort to ‘renationalise’ citizenship by reasserting that national membership is 
a privilege that states can take back”. This conditionality renders naturalised 
citizens highly insecure as: “tolerated as ‘eternal guests’ on probation but 




The normative political community, and the “lines of exteriority” (Nancy, 1992, 
p.393) it is attempting to uphold through a range of legal and socio-political 
practices, has thrown into sharp relief the violence of exclusion as the bare 
“working of injustice” (Nancy, 1992, p.392). Practices such the securitisation, 
hyper-criminalisation of identities, and the resort to a punitive rationality in 
governing and disciplining certain political identities are violent and 
exclusionary in so far as they entail border operations, such as detention 
without time-limit or judicial reviews, deportation, citizenship stripping and 
banishment. By juxtaposing these practices with the discourses of global 
citizenship, this article has attempted to open a critical space to recast the 
global citizen and its alterities in relational terms and to rethink them in their 
“intimate doubleness” (Nancy, 1992, p. 392). In other words, the alterities of 
the global citizen, which the normative political “community wants to exclude 
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[and with which it] does not let itself be identified” (Nancy, 1992, p. 393) are 
“nothing other than the in…or the ‘in-between’” (Nancy, 1992, p. 393, 
emphasis in original). Concomitantly, in its attempt to exclude the figure of the 
alterities of the global citizen, such a community “excludes its own 
foundations” (Nancy, 1992, p. 393). 
At the same time, in privileging the neoliberal framing of global citizenship, 
what is glossed over is the precarisation of the alterities of the global citizen. 
This lack of acknowledgment of the “Other” and his/her precarious condition 
(Markell 2003), entails “the revelation of oneself as having denied or distorted 
[the] relationship” (Cavell, 1999, p. 428) with said Other. This denial, whilst it 
becomes “a medium of injustice” (Markell, 2003, p. 2) by “closing off some 
people’s practical possibilities for the sake of other people’s sense of … 
invulnerability” (Markell, 2003, p. 2), is significant in so far as it shifts the 
discussion of precariousness from a focus on the alterities of the global 
citizenship to the structural sources that bring forth this lack of 
acknowledgement, including the meaning of this lack for those “who commit 
or benefit from it” Markell (2003, p. 21). These relationalities that construct 
alterity and exclusion in relation to the global citizen are also intersectional, 
and are impacted by class, race, gender and other complexly interrelated 
social difference discourses.    
In returning to Hannah Arendt’s critique of the construct of ‘human rights’, 
support can be given to her assertion that a new focus on the ‘the countryless 
refugee’ offers an opportunity for the development of a new paradigm of 
historical consciousness. The shift from human rights to citizenship rights is a 
marker of our times. Citizen rights give credence to neoliberal discourses of 
the nation state, hyper-securitisation, the global conflicts of international 
relations framed within the operations of global capitalism, and global 
citizenship in its neoliberal mode. A number of violences are performed 
through global citizenship operations in its neoliberal modality. These are 
material, representational, and symbolic in nature, amongst other violences 
performed. Global citizenship in the veins of liberal humanism and, more so, 
neoliberalism has come to represent those violences while acting to hide 
them, inflecting its own contradictions. The centralising of the ‘figure of the 
refugee’ may well offer an opportunity to render speakable the plight of the 
refugee/non-citizen/unwanted Other, if it is accorded the space and attention 
of critical political consciousness. For this to happen, strains of global 
citizenship, and by extrapolation – global citizenship education, that silence 
and neutralise the alterities of global citizenship need being unpacked, 
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revealed, and contested. In Butlerian terms, the question of whose life is 
grievable, needs to be asked in correspondence with whose freedom of 
mobility is possible, and whose global citizenship, and global citizenship 
education, can be enacted for whom. The privilege afforded the global citizen 
in whose name the unwanted migratory Other is made intelligible, is one 
propped up by an architecture of bordering, one which marks the 
contradiction of global citizenship in this modality as a fatal flaw (Swanson, 
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